In this broadcast, Issam Khoury addresses scenarios of Syria’s involvement in the war against Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and offers important advice aimed at keeping Syria neutral from neighboring conflicts, and focusing on the local economy instead of spending the country’s human resources on wars

Is Ahmed Al-Shar‛s government getting involved in the current conflict between Iran and Israel? And its ally the United States?
Is Ahmed Al-Shar‛ playing a military role against Hezbollah, especially since his forces have deployed on the Lebanese–Syrian border recently in large numbers?
Or is his army playing a central role in confronting the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces militia on the Iraqi border?
Especially since Israeli aircraft struck the al-Qaim area twice in succession and targeted a number of PMF militia commanders there, while not striking the Syrian army forces deployed in that area.

These are questions we need to think about generally. Is there an undeclared alliance between Israel and Ahmed Al-Shar‛ and his government to carry out special operations against Hezbollah? This question has become common in many circles, especially after information about an Israeli parachute landing in the Sargaya area and from there advancing to the Lebanese border, where they were repelled the second time when they attempted a landing and the Sargaya area was shelled with rockets. This prompted the official Syrian news agency to state there had been aggression on Syrian soil without mentioning the Israeli landing in that area. These matters indicate some kind of understanding between Israel and America or perhaps between Israel and Ahmed Al-Shar‛’s government via the American intermediary, or that orders are being given for certain changes. Of course, all these variables give us general indicators about any action the Syrian government might take, especially since the head of the Transitional Authority Ahmed Al-Shar‛ spoke directly with the Lebanese prime minister and expressed his support for the Lebanese army.

Here we must consider a number of points: is the Syrian government with its newly formed army actually capable of engaging in a war against Hezbollah? In reality the Syrian army’s structure is that of militias and it can play a role in what are called street wars, especially in mountainous and rugged areas since they spent a long time in such regions; thus they may be influential in the Qalamoun mountains and in confronting Hezbollah groups and could have a wide role, but they lack experience in the geography of Lebanon’s Bekaa region so they would not be primarily effective there. They do not have air force capabilities but they have some drones, and at the same time Hezbollah has some drones. In this regard the Israelis might provide Ahmed Al-Shar‛’s government or his army with coordinates to strike Hezbollah.

But is Israel convinced by Ahmed Al-Shar‛’s army? I think all these factors make the relationship very complicated. What Israel could do if a clash occurs between the two parties is bombard certain areas to pave the way for a broader ground entry by Ahmed Al-Shar‛’s army into that area, but after they secure that area will Israel allow them to remain on Lebanese soil? Israel will not allow them to be present in the Syrian south, so it cannot allow them to be present in the Lebanese south either—expanding the encirclement of Israel and dragging Israel into a new adventure similar to its later adventure with Hamas after several years. Certainly Israeli media rejects this and the Israeli army rejects it.

So what I clearly see is that the Syrian army at present, due to several dilemmas it faces, first has armed forces and security networks not fully integrated into the state. It is true it is said the Syrian army is a unified army, but we still feel the Syrian state is under the control of Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham. To be logical, the National Army until now—although its commanders have become deputies and others like Abu Amsha and a large number of commanders—still retain their basic operational structure; they only changed names from the National Army to a certain brigade or another, but in essence in institutional relations they still operate as militias. This is a very important point.

Perhaps the Syrian army may later succeed in developing practical performance to become an integrated army, but it needs time. In this context it is difficult for the Syrian state to engage with any other state, especially a state with institutional structures like Lebanon and an air force. If there is cooperation between it and the Lebanese army the entry might be joint: the Syrian army would conduct operations concerned with street warfare while the Lebanese army would deploy and fill the vacuum.

Nevertheless there are fears even on the part of the Lebanese army toward the Syrian army and they do not feel very confident in the Syrian state. Many crises—such as open borders, problems with drug smugglers, and others—and there are rogue groups inside Syria not even within militias; controlling them is a difficult process that takes time.

But my personal estimate is that there will be no clash at present; rather the Syrian message to the Lebanese presidency or the Lebanese army is that we will be together, and this sends an indicator to Hezbollah not to extend its control over Lebanon completely.

The other side raises important indicators about Syria’s future. The region in Syria lives in a very fragile state of stability. For example, the Syrian Democratic Forces still have their basic structure; it is true they appointed Siwan Hamo as deputy president in the eastern region, but these forces still maintain their fundamental structure and many people in them believe in ideas outside the framework of the Syrian state such as federalism, while the regime in Damascus speaks of centralization.

Today we see a lack of political consensus, and there are fears of the return of ISIS. These dormant cells could grow more if chaos occurs in the region.

Here the situation is very dangerous because it does not concern only Iraq but Anbar extending to the Syrian desert, all connected areas that are difficult to secure.

Therefore we may see a new breakdown and a general absence of state discipline in this region, which is very dangerous and could even reflect on Damascus.

The situation will not be very stable for Syria especially since the state is fragile and does not have large financial resources. This may lead to the return of corruption and the recycling of smuggling networks on the Syrian–Lebanese border.

So if there is no real cooperation between the Lebanese army and the Syrian army to secure the borders, smuggling operations may become active again.

But what we notice today in Ahmed Al-Shar‛’s government is that it is more a government of slogans than a government of action on the ground. For example they raised the issue of a new lira with zeros removed, but this currency has not actually spread clearly in the Syrian market.

This indicates a lack of real economic confidence. A state that cannot achieve economic stability may sometimes resort to wars to finance itself.

The danger here is that the Syrian army could be pushed into a battle it is unprepared for with Hezbollah, and then Syrian youth will pay the price of this war with increased deaths and destruction.
So in my opinion we are not in that situation currently, and what is required of the Syrian government is to stay away from these conflicts and focus on the economy and state-building.

We talk about this in this video and in other videos for one reason: it is necessary to push our youth and people to think about civil work and to push the government and officials not to move toward militarization.

If we want to build the country properly for Syria, we must think about the economy and stay away from liars, and the Syrian government must remove the liars from power.

May you be granted health and well-being.